As it was founded by John Austin, the analytical school is also known as the Austinian school. It is likewise alluded to as an imperative school since it views the legislation as the order of supreme political leader. Dias alludes to this methodology as “Positivism,” because the subject of the school is positive legislation.
This school acquired fame in the 19th century. The reason was a distinctive element of 18th century legitimate ideas. Individualism was a sign of the faction of sanity. Kant, Rousseau, Locke, and Descartes all stressed reason as a definitive guide and judge in all issues.
Rules of Analytical School
- The difference among what legislation is? And what legislation should be – It’s a feature shared by all positivists; for instance, Bentham’s legislation and Morality follow the same path but have different circumferences. Austin doesn’t reject that morality assumes a part in the advancement of legislation; nonetheless, morality has no bearing in his hypothesis. Positive legislation, as indicated by him, has a self-contained norm. Dias, Hughes, Paton, Stone, Fuller, and others have condemned this methodology.
- Centralization of positive legislation is the solitary thing that scholars of analytical approach consider. They would prefer to zero in exclusively on legitimate realities. The analytical legislation specialists set off to find the arrangement through assessment, depicting the whole collection of legitimate statutes that apply in a given structure as having been made in one advancement on a sane arrangement to which they follow in every single angle.
- Regarding and as of the state, legislation – legislation, regardless of whether legal or administrative, is viewed as something delivered objectives by administrators by insightful legislation specialists. They accentuate the way that the statutory act gets the cognizant stamp of the state’s position, as opposed to how the statutes began regarding the substance. Thus, the most basic actuality is the creation of definitive acknowledgment of legislation and order by the lawmaker. In this unique situation, legislation is the outcome of human will that is dynamically careful and decided.
- The logic for to better understand legislation, scholars of positive schools have mostly relied on reasoning and dismissed moral issues. For theoretical school jurists, historical and social considerations have no meaning.
- Statutory Provisions – The term “legislation” refers to something that the government knowingly creates. The school’s primary concern is the legislation.
Characteristics of Analytical School:
- Analytical positivists believe that legislation and the state have a homogenous partnership. Legislators are the ones that create it. On the judicial side of the nation, these legislators may also be supreme political leaders.
- The supreme political leader encourages the application of the legislation. The establishment for supreme political leader political power is a well-organized community. The supreme political leader can only enforce the legislation in a disciplined manner along with the assistance of organized society’s power. In the eyes of Austin, the rule is indeed the supreme political leader’s order.
- Analytical theories assert that assessing statutory rights are required for the procedure to be binding. These people are convinced that the application of discipline necessitates the intervention of a judge.
Proponents of Analytical School
Hart, Hoffield, Gray, Kelsen, Salmond, Holland, Austin, and Bentham are some of the highly influencing proponents of this school.
Bentham’ Positivism: As Bentham’s Contribution to the Analytical School
Jeremy Bentham is credited with founding the Analytical school. In one book, he dismissed the tenets of natural legislation, while in another, he elucidated the idea of utility with empirical precision. He distinguished expository jurisprudence from censorial jurisprudence.
The first one is related to the legislation as it currently exists and the second one is related to the legislation as it should be. The impact of natural legislation had not faded entirely, as Bentham’s examination of censorial jurisprudence shows, which is the reason that he spoke of utility as the leading rule. This may explain why Bentham isn’t considered the founder of analytical philosophy. He insists that the state and the supreme political leader produce legislation.
Bentham’s description of legislation is obligatory, and he favored the word “mandate” to “legislation.” Legislation could be characterized as an assortment of sins declaring a breach formulated or enacted by the supreme political leader in a state in connection to the actions to be followed inside a specific situation by a particular individual or even a set of to his authority in that case specifically.
Bentham has a much more progressive attitude of legal sanction than Austin. Sanctions do not have to be legal in his opinion. Moral or religious sanctions can be used to support a supreme political leader’s order. As an outcome, Lord Lloyd believes that Bentham’s imperative theory “steers clear of a range of traps that Austin fell into.”
Austin’s Positivism: As Austin’s Contribution to the Analytical School
“The Province of Jurisprudence Determined,” a collection of John Austin’s lectures, was first published in 1832. As an outcome of the challenges, Austin is known as the founder of the Analytical School, as it was the first detailed and accurate evaluation and examination of the subject that advocated the analytical positivist philosophy.
He described the jurisprudence’s degree and set its limits. His method was analytical. Austin expanded on Bentham’s basis of expository jurisprudence and ignored extra-legal norms. He made a distinction among both the philosophy of statute and legislation, as well as morality.
Jurisprudence referred to the systematic evaluation and examination of legislative rules to Austin. He separates jurisprudence into two categories: general jurisprudence and specific jurisprudence. Austin took the current legal structure, which is based on positive legislation, and reduced it to its simplest form.
Positive legislation differs from positive morality in that it is a state-produced element and supreme political leader. In the view of Austin, the major difference between positive morality and positive legislation is that the prior is established by a political supreme leader, while the other is not the outcome of state and supreme political leader, and thus is not legislation. Any definition of justice cannot be used to describe legislation.
Jurisprudence is a discipline that only deals with good legislation. In the views of Austin, positive legislation research can be achieved by applying reasoning to the legislation without taking into account the legislation’s ethical past. In his evaluation and examination of law and legislation, Austin neglected both legal, social, and cultural considerations, stating that it is difficult to locate fundamental rules in legislation using logic alone, such as notions that were fundamental in all developed legal systems.
Austin’s method, research, and conclusions, on the other side, are unique to a centralized politics with federal authority. It is not as important to Indian and American legal systems as it is to Indian and American legal systems.
He categorizes all legislations into two categories:
- The legislation “properly referred to”- These legislations are direct or indirect commands from a higher political leader.
- Legislations that are “improperly referred to” – These legislations are not derived from any specific source and are not constructed explicitly or implicitly by a political leader.
Positive legislation contains four components, in the views of him:
- Supreme political leaders
Criticism of Austin’s Positivism
Austin’s idea of positivism has been criticized on the following grounds:
- Not Universal: The idea of legislation as a command is given by Austin is not uniform. It only applies to such statutes, such as criminal legislation, and lacks a large portion of the legislation that describes and empowers people’s rights. Such legislations do not require or prohibit the act or omission of any act. Contract legislation and property legislation are two examples of such legislation.
- Identification of a “supreme political leader Authority”: In a personal context, Austin has addressed the supreme political leader. It implies that the orders are issued by someone in a position of power. Due to the doctrine of separation of powers and the advent of the “legislature,” it is hard to discover such a “personal leader” in a modern nation-state.
- Consistency of legislation: In the views of Austin, directions are provided by one specific political authority with one specific political recipient on a particular matter. As an outcome, the legislation is valid as long as the political superior who drafted it is alive. Its continuation is contingent on the will of the next political superior. In a democratic state based on liberal doctrines, this cannot be claimed to be the case. Only those legislation that has been approved by the Constitution is overturned in such a nation.
- Ignorant to Realistic approach: In the views of Austin’s parameters, real legislation, which applies to judge-made legislation, cannot be assumed to be legislation “properly so-called.” In the modern world, however, this cannot be said to be accurate. Judge-made legislation, also known as real legislation, is an important component of many existing legal systems.
- Procedural Requirements: Even now, a politically superior authority must obey a fixed protocol when making a rule. Both declarations and desires are not labeled as “commands” or “legislations.” Austin seems to have preferred to disregard this feature of contemporary cultures and states.
Holland’s contribution to Analytical School
Another exponent of the analytical school in Holland. He’s one of Austin’s followers. In his understanding of the word “positive legislation,” however, he varies from Austin. He describes the legislation as rules of external humankind imposed by a supreme political influence, instead of all legislations being under the authority of the supreme political leader.
Salmond on Analytical School
Salmond is a member of the theoretical school, but he distinguishes himself from other exponents of Analytical School in many respects. There are the following:
- By establishing jurisprudence as the science of civil legislation, he abandons the quest for fundamental rules in legislation. There is no such thing as a fundamental feature in legislation since it is the science of land legislation, which is influenced by factors that exist in a specific state.
- He struggles with low-level issues, but the rule, in his opinion, should be described in terms of courts rather than supreme political leaders. Only the courts are responsible for enforcing the legislation.
- He disagreed with Austin that legal interpretation could be accomplished solely by reasoning. He argues that an examination of jurisprudence that lacks ethical and historical considerations would be desolate.
Kelson’s pure theory of legislation on Analytical School
Kelson’s theory of legislation, also recognized as the pure theory of legislation, holds that legislation should be free of social sciences such as psychology, sociology, and social history. Kelson’s goal was to create a pure science of legislation, free of philosophical, ethical, moral, psychological, and sociological elements.
His goal goes above building a self-contained legal science based on positivistic inventive rules, as he was frequently of the notions of equity, justice, and natural legislation rules. He completely disregards any of these considerations when it comes to the examination of legislation. Kelson describes the legislation as a set of rules that govern human psychology.
The essence of this command is characterized by –
- As it is influential and
- The factual reality that the legislation’s influential power is developed solely from the punishment it attracts. His sole goal was to decide what can be potentially learned about any legislation under any circumstances at any time.
The following are the basic pillars of Kelson’s system:
- The goal of legislation theory, like any other science, is to bring unity by reducing discord and diversity.
- Legal theory is a science, not an act of will. It is understanding of what the legislation is rather than what the legislation should be.
- Legislation is a social science, not a natural one.
- Legal theory is a standards philosophy. It is unconcerned about the legal system’s efficacy.
- A formal theory of legislation explains how to order evolving objects in a particular manner.
- Among legal theory and a particular framework of positive legislation, there is a possible real legislation relationship.
The idea of rules is the most distinctive aspect of Kelson’s theory. Jurisprudence, In the views of Kelson, is the evaluation and examination of a hierarchy of legislation. A hypothetical convention is nothing more than a preposition. The evaluation and examination of the existence and organization of certain normative proportions are referred to as jurisprudence.
It encompasses all rules established during the application of a standard operation to a particular behavior. A proposed model, as according to Kelson, is one in which new norms are regularly emerging generated on the authority of an originating or fundamental standard, whereas a consistent content is one in which the adequate internal control decides the substance of those generated from it as well as conferring legitimacy on them.
Repercussions of the Pure Theory
From his definition of grundnorm, Kelsen came to the following conclusions:
- Public and private legislation are indistinguishable.
- The idea of duty is more important than the idea of right. Every norm includes an element of “ought.”. He concluded that legislation fundamentally structures human actions and that the idea of duty is critical to achieving this goal. The idea of justice is a byproduct of the legislative system.
- Legislation employs personification solely as a means of achieving its objective as a normative science. As an outcome, for the goals of practicing legislation, the difference between natural and juristic persons is meaningless.
- The differentiation between substantive and procedural legislation is a relative one, with procedural legislation having a greater impact.
- The difference between a legal and a factual issue is arbitrary. A judge’s inference about what must have occurred to enforce a specific norm is called a factual reality.
- Kelsen opposed the separation of powers, arguing that all three branches of government—legislature, executive, and judiciary—are necessary “norm-creating” institutions.
Criticism of Kelson’s Pure Theory on Analytical School
Jurists also opposed Kelson’s pure theory of legislation. The following are the major criticisms:
- His idea of Grundnorm is hazy.
- Its fiction, as Friedman puts it, that can’t be traced in legal factual reality. Kelson seems to have based his work on the written constitution, but even in the written constitution, Grundnorm is composed of several components, none of which can be called Grundnorm by themselves.
- Any rule of legislation or standard is effective as it is supported by another rule or norm, but the grundnorm is not supported by any other rule or norm. The factual reality that a grundnorm is marginally useful determines its potency.
- A further significant legislation in Kelson’s theory is that he does not provide a requirement for determining the “minimum of effectiveness.” Kelson’s hypothesis has failed to be pure on this, In the views of authors like Friedman, Stone, and Stammer, regardless of how efficacy is calculated. The very minimum of usefulness can only be demonstrated by an examination of sociopolitical reality, which Kelson has completely dismissed.
H.L.A. Hart’s theory on Analytical School
H.L.A. Hart is widely considered to be the face of British Positivism. Austin’s view of legislation as “order” has been heavily criticized by him. To fight Austin’s analytical legal positivism, he employs the rules of “force” and “legislation.” Prof. Hart has primarily analyzed legislation as a set of legally enforceable legislation.
Primary & Secondary Rules
In the views of Hart, there are two types of rules: primary and secondary. The primary legislations are those that compel humans to do or refrain from doing certain activities. Secondary rules are those that come after primary rules and specify certain actions that, if carried out, can outcome in the advancement of new core rules. Obligations are considered primary legislation, whereas authority is considered secondary rules.
Defects in Primary Rules
In primary rules, Hart has described three legislations:
- Uncertainty- First and most serious legislation is the lack of clarity in core rules. There is no standard procedure for resolving differing opinions over the degree of primary legislation.
- Absolute Character- Another legislation in primary rules is the factual reality that they are constant. Only through the incremental evolution of society will primary rules change. As an outcome, primary rules become very rigid and stagnant as an outcome of the operation.
- Inefficiency- differing opinions over the infringement of a primary rule will often arise, and there is no fixed process, mechanism, or authorized person in place to resolve those conflicts. As an outcome, the “inefficiency” of primary legislation is the third legislation.
Remedies for the Defects
The easiest solution for the aforementioned legislations, In the views of Hart, is to add secondary rules for each of them. The following are the suggested remedies:
- “Rules of Recognition”- A secondary rule of acknowledgment, whereby primary rules are codified in the authoritative background document, can be added to remedy the legislation of confusion.
- “Rules of Change”- A secondary rule of acknowledgment, whereby primary rules are codified in an authoritative background document, can be added to remedy the legislation of confusion.
- “Rules of Adjudication”- A secondary rule of acknowledgment, whereby primary rules are enacted in an authoritative background document, can be added to remedy the legislation of confusion.
Criticism of Hart’s Theory on Analytical School
Hart’s division of primary and secondary legislation, In the views of Lord Lloyd, is an immensely useful method for interpreting legal rules. He, on the contrary, has reservations about the idea that all legal legislation can be divided into primary and secondary categories. He also raised his feelings about Hart’s “internal component” of legislation, which he describes as “ambiguous” and “immeasurable.” Prof. Ronald Dworkin criticizes Hart’s philosophy as he only acknowledges legislation. He responds with the definition of “rules.” Hart, In the views of Eckhoff, has mixed up the binding element of the legislation with other parts of the legislation.
Both Kelsen and Hart’s ideas are foundational to the Analytical School of legislation. However both ideas may have diminished their usefulness in contemporary days for a range of factors, they are still used by numerous jurists and philosophers in their examination and evaluation and examination of legislative rules.
From this article following things can be concluded:
The relationship between legislation and the state is the most critical feature of legislation. Legislation is regarded as a state-issued command. It emphasizes the significance of legislation as the basis of legislation.
Several philosophers and judges have contrasted Austin’s and Bentham’s views, concluding that the latter is more suitable in civilized democracies. Austin’s idea of positive legislation and positivism ideology has indeed been heavily criticized, and its appropriateness and validity have been phased out by civilized countries. Despite this, many important theories on empirical legal positivism have emerged as an outcome of it.
Both Kelsen and Hart’s ideas are foundational to the Analytical School of legislation. Despite the factual reality that both ideas have diminished their usefulness in contemporary days due to a wide range, they are still being used by numerous scholars and philosophers in the examination and examination of legal rules.